Internet Marketing Assignment Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Internet Marketing - Assignment Example Source from website: http://www.toshiba.co.uk/about/index.html Toshiba's strategy has been to support from behind and offer its executives sufficient responsibility in the local offices. It is an enormously focussed and transparent and its commitment to excellence has held it in good stead. Toshiba has products in varied domains. Its primary domain comprises of notebook computer and related equipment and peripherals, mobile phones, home entertainment segment with AV equipment, including digital and flat panel TVs, and portable personal equipment and home appliances. Its major competitors would be Dell, Hp and Compaq in the notebook segments, Sony in home entertainment sector, flat panel TV's and PDA's by Dell. Customers would be retailers and individual consumers. This is a mass marketing segment over the Internet and these target consumers are more probable to end up in a purchase. They are very strong market players in electronic devices & components consisting of semiconductors, electron tubes, opto-electronic devices, LCDs, batteries, printed circuits boards, etc., but it is a more niche marketing segment which may or may not end up doing the purchase over the Internet. Consumers would include high technology operators and business. Another stable sector for Toshiba is the domain that sells industrial apparatus, power generating equipment, transportation equipment, social automation equipment, telecommunication systems, broadcasting systems, elevators & escalators, medical systems, etc. The target segment would be hospitals and medical facilities, municipalities, universities, commercial construction companies. The purchasing power of these consumers need to be very high and often these decisions a thorough product evaluation that may not be possible through the website. The website will be more of a product introduction that may lead to a purchase through an agent after product observation. Evaluation of the site The website is a part of the integrated marketing approach of Toshiba. With the number of Internet users exploding, it is imperative that the website is utilized to generate awareness and business for the company. The website scores on theses counts. It is very well laid out. The look of it is clean and it plays a great part in enhancing the brand and the company, to the professional image they portray. There is consistency in the presentation of information and common standards are maintained in the presentation of the information throughout. The site has a complete list of all the company's products, product information and registration, owner's manuals and service information as well as enabling consumers to purchase accessories and news releases pertaining to the segment. The look and feel of the site is also very simple and seems to encompass all of Toshiba's marketing disciplines. There is sufficient information for the knowledgeable buyer and there were no error messages encountered through the time it was navigated. It is easily navigable and quite user friendly. However, the site seems to have an overload of information and the product categories are all listed together. An individual consumer and the products he wants to buy are very different from a business and

Psychology of Homer Simpsons Essay Example for Free

Psychology of Homer Simpsons Essay The Simpsons have been America’s phenomenal cartoon TV series that has a chilling resemblance to the typical family, if it would be viewed in a different angle removing the humour and exaggerations. The melodious opening song, Bart’s writing on the board, to the sofa antic just gives that tinge of spice to the expecting viewers. However, what usually catches the interest of the people is Homer. His credulous and sometimes sordid character ironically gives justice to the struggle of middle class families and perfectly depicts the role and challenges of a father who is facing the ordeals in the midst of a family crisis and his obligation as a citizen in the society.   A saying goes that the father is the home’s foundation. If that foundation would be weak, the family will collapse and disperse on the ground. He is the one that stands firm amongst difficult adversities a family faces and would be the source of their hope. Homer Simpsons heavy stature and obsession with Duff beer seems to exclude him from this description of this sturdy foundation. In Season 1, episode 3, Homer lost his job in front of his son in the Nuclear Plant. He became the common bum. He would lie on the sofa all day long, doing nothing and with a blank stare at the TV set, while Marge is working at a fast food chain on roller skates. He came to thirst for beer, since he was sober for a while due to lack of finances. With humour he searched for any kind of source for income including Bart’s piggy bank and going that low ,which wasn’t even worth it because it wasn’t even enough for one beer, he then came to a realization of what he has become. He decided on taking his own life by throwing himself in a watery grave. With a boulder around his neck he walked slowly towards the river. This action exhibited man’s reaction in time of weakness and lost of sight for ones purpose in life. However, he still managed to oil the fence upon going out, showing his compulsiveness of taking care of his own home. At the river, on the last minute he was about to throw away his life, his family came to the rescue. However, it turned out that it was Homer who would rescue them in the middle of the intersection from a speeding vehicle, and that is with a boulder hanging around his neck. The instinct of a father protecting his family came in stronger than his human weakness. Then, it dawned on him that the town needs someone to uphold safety around the place. He found his silver lining among the dark clouds. He went against even with his boss, Mr. Burns, just to be able to completely eradicate the town of danger. Mr. Burns even blackmailed Homer of giving his job back if he would just turn back on his own words about the plant’s safety. Homer almost gave in but his principles were as sturdy as his love for his family and community. Although, like water looking for its way back to the sea, Homer still got his job back and was still able to uphold his principle. He became the plant’s safety man. The seemingly ignorant and weakling personality of Homer turned out to be actually a shallow shroud that clothes his inner strength that brought hope and respect not only from his family but from his community as well. He secretly became a beacon to their hearts. He just needed that chance to bring it out of him.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Fathers have always been the icon of providing for his family. Since ancient times, these men are the ones that bring home the slaughtered meal after a dangerous and tedious hunt. Nothing has changed ever since except for the barbarism. Nowadays, the head of the families would still need to â€Å"hunt† for their income in order to provide for their pecuniary needs. Homer Simpsons is the kind of employee that slack-off during work, taking unscheduled doughnut breaks and seemingly doing his job but not actually serious about it. A provider, yes that he could be, but a good one is a dubious fact. In the first episode for season 1, a Christmas special of The Simpsons, Homer established the answer to this question. Mr. Burns joyously announced to the intercom that there is an increase in the safety of the plant but unfortunately no Holiday bonus for the mid-level workers. It saddened everyone, Homer on the other hand was still thankful because they had a â€Å"Christmas jar† that Marge has been keeping. But, little did he know that it was all spent on Bart’s surgery to remove the tattoo he just got. Upon entering the Simpsons home, he knew of the ordeal they are in. Marge had high hopes knowing that he had a Christmas bonus and Homer didn’t have the heart to break the news to his family, not with all those looks that are on tenterhooks. Homer, like our forefathers, hunted for a way to earn some extra income for his family, so that they won’t have to miss Christmas. He found one as a mall’s Santa Claus. He kept it a secret from his family in order to keep his family from worrying and his dignity as well. In a particular scene, it showed Homer going home from his Santa training exhausted and bad enough his sisters-in-law made a visit. Homer never did like them but because of his love for Marge, he still tried to be cou rteous and said his hellos. The gentleness, like any beast or man has, had been placed above the brute that he was. However, Bart discovered his clandestine accidentally but they made a bond not to speak of it. When pay day came Homer only got a measly $13. He got really disappointed but Barney asked him to try his luck on a dog race and take the chance of doubling his earnings. Homer refused for he didn’t want Bart to grow-up with that kind of values. It was Bart who encouraged his dad to take the risk because he believed that miracles happen to unfortunate kids especially in Christmastime. Thus, father and son embarked on the journey to try their luck. But fate made a twist on Bart’s little hope for miracle. The dog they made a bet on lost and so did their measly hope for their Christmas gifts. Broken hearted they went home. However , with a twist of event, the dog ironically named Santa’s little helper, was booted out by its owner and as fate smiled on both unfortunate souls, they found refuge in the arms of one another. Homer brought home the dog and it turned out to be the best Christmas they ever had. Homer indeed provided but not with mere money but with the gift of love for his family.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   A father is also a source of wisdom and guidance. He is not just the role model in a family but considered as his children’s hero. A father’s advice is treasured like nothing else and he is remembered with it even until his next life.   Homer’s clumsiness and ignorant responses are attitudes wherein a person won’t dare to ask or even take an advice from. He would even sometimes strangle Bart whenever he catches him with his smart alecks. However, that is just a part of his comic act for humour sake. On episode 2 and 5, Homer exhibited the support, love and guidance an ideal father gives in spite of his once-in-a while shallowness. He gave his children a strong arm they can run to and a shoulder they can cry on. Homer handed down his advice as carefully as our forefathers handed down their gift of wisdom to the generations next to them.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Homer Simpsons is a comical proof of what human beings are in an ironic sense. Behind the humour and funny antics is the true father figure we have all known. He merely shows that there is always two sides of the coin, it could either be our bad or our good side. Homer Simpsons simply teaches us that we should never pass judgement to people by a mere look or by the way they talk, because their works and most of all their family might attest to their greatness above all.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚      References Groening, M et.al Burkes,J. , Simon,S. (Producers). Copyright 1990. Gracie Films. Twentieth  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚     Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Century Fox Film Corp.(Distributor).

Essay on Mr.Woodhouse and Miss Bates in Jane Austens Emma

The Characters of  Mr.Woodhouse and Miss Bates in Emma      The immediate impression one gets of Miss Bates is that of a loquacious old biddy, one of Emma's more annoying personalities. But Miss Bates offers a refreshing contrast to the other characters in the novel, many of whom harbor hidden agendas and thinly veiled animosities toward perceived rivals. If "every major character in Emma [is] a snob", we might consider Miss Bates the anti-snob. Her very artlessness serves as a foil for those in the novel whom present contrived images of themselves or whom look down their noses at others. When she compliments others' concern and generosity, as she is constantly found doing, there can be no doubt that her sentiments are genuine, if somewhat misplaced. She always speaks her mind -- but then, her mind is always occupied with the good, making her lack of cant pleasant rather than overbearing. In the first part of the book, Miss Bates serves not only as the anti-snob, but also the anti-Emma. Whereas Emma is described at the outset as being "handsome, clever, and rich," Miss Bates "enjoy[s] a most uncommon degree of popularity for a woman neither young, handsome, rich, nor married." Nor, obviously, clever. Life has denied her everything that Emma has been granted; and how does Emma treat her, and speak of her to others? Shabbily, of course. "If I thought I should ever be like Miss Bates," Emma tells Harriet, who has expressed concern about Emma's choice to remain unmarried, "so silly, so satisfied, so smiling, so prosing, so undistinguishing and unfastidious, and so apt to tell everything relative to everybody about me, I would marry to-morrow." She neglects to visit the Bateses often because of "all the horror of being in dange... ... York: The Oxford University press, 1923-1988. Cookson, Linda, and Brian Loughrey, eds. Critical essays on Emma [of] Jane Austen. Harlow: Longman Literature Guides [series], 1988. Craik, W. A. The Development of Jane Austen's comic art: Emma: Jane Austen's mature comic art. London: Audio Learning, 1978. Sound recording; 1 cassette; 2-track. mono. Gard, Roger, [1936- ]. Jane Austen, Emma and Persuasion. Harmondsworth : Penguin, Penguin masterstudies [series], 1985.    Monaghan, David, ed. Emma, by Jane Austen. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992. Parrish, Stephen M, ed. Emma: an authoritative text: backgrounds, reviews, and criticism. New York : W.W. Norton, A Norton critical edition [series], 1972,1993. Sabiston, Elizabeth Jean, [1937- ]. The Prison of Womanhood: four provincial heroines in nineteenth-century fiction. London : Macmillan, 1987.

Ikea Children Labour

KEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) In May 1995, Marianne Barner faced a tough decision. After just two years with IKEA, the world’s largest furniture retailer, and less than a year into her job as business area manager for carpets, she was faced with the decision of cutting off one of the company’s major suppliers of Indian rugs. While such a move would disrupt supply and affect sales, she found the reasons to do so quite compelling.A German TV station had just broadcast an investigative report naming the supplier as one that used child labor in the production of rugs made for IKEA. What frustrated Barner was that, like all other IKEA suppliers, this large, well-regarded company had recently signed an addendum to its supply contract explicitly forbidding the use of child labor on pain of termination. Even more difficult than this short-term decision was the long-term action Barner knew IKEA must take on this issue. On one hand, she w as being urged to sign up to an industry-wide response to growing concerns about the use of child labor in the Indian carpet industry.A recently formed partnership of manufacturers, importers, retailers, and Indian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) was proposing to issue and monitor the use of â€Å"Rugmark,† a label to be put on carpets certifying that they were made without child labor. Simultaneously, Barner had been conversing with people at the Swedish Save the Children organization who were urging IKEA to ensure that its response to the situation was â€Å"in the best interest of the child†Ã¢â‚¬â€whatever that might imply. Finally, there were some who wondered if IKEA should not just leave this hornet’s nest.Indian rugs accounted for a tiny part of IKEA’s turnover, and to these observers, the time, cost, and reputation risk posed by continuing this product line seemed not worth the profit potential. The Birth and Maturing of a Global Company1 To understand IKEA’s operations, one had to understand the philosophy and beliefs of its 70year-old founder, Ingvar Kamprad. Despite stepping down as CEO in 1986, almost a decade later, Kamprad retained the title of honorary chairman and was still very involved in the company’s activities.Yet perhaps even more powerful than his ongoing presence were his strongly held values and beliefs, which long ago had been deeply embedded in IKEA’s culture. Kamprad was 17 years old when he started the mail-order company he called IKEA, a name that combined his initials with those of his family farm, Elmtaryd, and parish, Agunnaryd, located in the ____________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________ Professor Christopher A.Bartlett, Executive Director of the HBS Europe Research Center Vincent Dessain, and Research Associate Anders Sjoman prepared this case. HBS cases are developed solely as the basis for class discuss ion. Certain details have been disguised. Cases are not intended to serve as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective management. Copyright  © 2006 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www. bsp. harvard. edu. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any means—electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise—without the permission of Harvard Business School. 906-414 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) forests of southern Sweden. Working out of the family kitchen, he sold goods such as fountain pens, cigarette lighters, and binders he purchased from low-priced sources and then advertised in a newsletter to local shopkeepers.Wh en Kamprad matched his competitors by adding furniture to his newsletter in 1948, the immediate success of the new line led him to give up the small items. In 1951, to reduce product returns, he opened a display store in nearby Almhult village to allow customers to inspect products before buying. It was an immediate success, with customers traveling seven hours from the capital Stockholm by train to visit. Based on the store’s success, IKEA stopped accepting mail orders. Later Kamprad reflected, â€Å"The basis of the modern IKEA concept was created [at this time] and in principle it still applies.First and foremost, we use a catalog to tempt people to visit an exhibition, which today is our store. . . . Then, catalog in hand, customers can see simple interiors for themselves, touch the furniture they want to buy and then write out an order. †2 As Kamprad developed and refined his furniture retailing business model he became increasingly frustrated with the way a tight ly knit cartel of furniture manufacturers controlled the Swedish industry to keep prices high. He began to view the situation not just as a business opportunity but also as an unacceptable social problem that he wanted to correct.Foreshadowing a vision for IKEA that would later be articulated as â€Å"creating a better life for the many people,† he wrote: â€Å"A disproportionately large part of all resources is used to satisfy a small part of the population. . . . IKEA’s aim is to change this situation. We shall offer a wide range of home furnishing items of good design and function at prices so low that the majority of people can afford to buy them. . . . We have great ambitions. †3 The small newsletter soon expanded into a full catalog. The 1953 issue introduced what would become another key IKEA feature: self-assembled furniture.Instead of buying complete pieces of furniture, customers bought them in flat packages and put them together themselves at home. So on, the â€Å"knockdown† concept was fully systemized, saving transport and storage costs. In typical fashion, Kamprad turned the savings into still lower prices for his customers, gaining an even larger following among young postwar householders looking for well-designed but inexpensive furniture. Between 1953 and 1955, the company’s sales doubled from SEK 3 million to SEK 6 million. 4Managing Suppliers: Developing Sourcing Principles As its sales took off in the late 1950s, IKEA’s radically new concepts began to encounter stiff opposition from Sweden’s large furniture retailers. So threatened were they that when IKEA began exhibiting at trade fairs, they colluded to stop the company from taking orders at the fairs and eventually even from showing its prices. The cartel also pressured manufacturers not to sell to IKEA, and the few that continued to do so often made their deliveries at night in unmarked vans.Unable to meet demand with such constrained loc al supply, Kamprad was forced to look abroad for new sources. In 1961, he contracted with several furniture factories in Poland, a country still in the Communist eastern bloc. To assure quality output and reliable delivery, IKEA brought its knowhow, taught its processes, and even provided machinery to the new suppliers, revitalizing Poland’s furniture industry as it did so. Poland soon became IKEA’s largest source and, to Kamprad’s delight, at much lower costs—once again allowing him to reduce his prices.Following its success in Poland, IKEA adopted a general procurement principle that it should not own its means of production but should seek to develop close ties by supporting its suppliers in a 2 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) 906-414 long-term relationship. a Beyond supply contracts and technology transfer, the relationship led IKEA to make loans to its suppliers at reasonable rates, repayable through future sh ipments. â€Å"Our objective is to develop long-term business partners,† explained a senior purchasing manager. We commit to doing all we can to keep them competitive—as long as they remain equally committed to us. We are in this for the long run. † Although the relationship between IKEA and its suppliers was often described as one of mutual dependency, suppliers also knew that they had to remain competitive to keep their contract. From the outset they understood that if a more cost-effective alternative appeared, IKEA would try to help them respond, but if they could not do so, it would move production. In its constant quest to lower prices, the company developed an unusual way of identifying new sources.As a veteran IKEA manager explained: â€Å"We do not buy products from our suppliers. We buy unused production capacity. † It was a philosophy that often led its purchasing managers to seek out seasonal manufacturers with spare off-season capacity. There were many classic examples of how IKEA matched products to supplier capabilities: they had sail makers make seat cushions, window factories produce table frames, and ski manufacturers build chairs in their off-season. The manager added, â€Å"We’ve always worried more about finding the right management at our suppliers than finding high-tech facilities.We will always help good management to develop their capacity. † Growing Retail: Expanding Abroad Building on the success of his first store, Kamprad self-financed a store in Stockholm in 1965. Recognizing a growing use of automobiles in Sweden, he bucked the practice of having a downtown showroom and opted for a suburban location with ample parking space. When customers drove home with their furniture in flat packed boxes, they assumed two of the costliest parts of traditional furniture retailing—home delivery and assembly. In 1963, even before the Stockholm store had opened, IKEA had expanded into Oslo, Norway.A decade later, Switzerland became its first non-Scandinavian market, and in 1974 IKEA entered Germany, which soon became its largest market. (See Exhibit 1 for IKEA’s worldwide expansion. ) At each new store the same simple Scandinavian-design products were backed up with a catalog and offbeat advertising, presenting the company as â€Å"those impossible Swedes with strange ideas. † And reflecting the company’s conservative values, each new entry was financed by previous successes. b During this expansion, the IKEA concept evolved and became increasingly formalized. (Exhibit 2 summarizes important events in IKEA’s corporate history. It still built large, suburban stores with knockdown furniture in flat packages the customers brought home to assemble themselves. But as the concept was refined, the company required that each store follow a predetermined design, set up to maximize customers’ exposure to the product range. The concept mandated, for ins tance, that the living room interiors should follow immediately after the entrance. IKEA also serviced customers with features such as a playroom for children, a low-priced restaurant, and a â€Å"Sweden Shop† for groceries that had made IKEA Sweden’s leading food exporter. At the same time, the range gradually This policy was modified after a number of East European suppliers broke their contracts with IKEA after the fall of the Berlin Wall opened new markets for them. IKEA’s subsequent supply chain problems and loss of substantial investments led management to develop an internal production company, Swedwood, to ensure delivery stability. However, it was decided that only a limited amount of IKEA’s purchases (perhaps 10%) should be sourced from Swedwood. b By 2005, company lore had it that IKEA had only taken one bank loan in its corporate history—which it had paid back as soon as the cash flow allowed. 906-414 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Chall enge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) expanded beyond furniture to include a full line of home furnishing products such as textiles, kitchen utensils, flooring, rugs and carpets, lamps, and plants. The Emerging Culture and Values5 As Kamprad’s evolving business philosophy was formalized into the IKEA vision statement, â€Å"To create a better everyday life for the many people,† it became the foundation of the company’s strategy of selling affordable, good-quality furniture to mass-market consumers around the world.The cultural norms and values that developed to support the strategy’s implementation were also, in many ways, an extension of Kamprad’s personal beliefs and style. â€Å"The true IKEA spirit,† he remarked, â€Å"is founded on our enthusiasm, our constant will to renew, on our cost-consciousness, on our willingness to assume responsibility and to help, on our humbleness before the task, and on the simplicity of our behavior. † As well as a summary of his aspiration for the company’s behavioral norms, it was also a good statement of Kamprad’s own personal management style.Over the years a very distinct organizational culture and management style emerged in IKEA reflecting these values. For example, the company operated very informally as evidenced by the open-plan office landscape, where even the CEO did not have a separate office, and the familiar and personal way all employees addressed one another. But that informality often masked an intensity that derived from the organization’s high self-imposed standards. As one senior executive explained, â€Å"Because there is no security available behind status or closed doors, this environment actually puts pressure on people to perform. The IKEA management process also stressed simplicity and attention to detail. â€Å"Complicated rules paralyze! † said Kamprad. The company organized â€Å"anti-bureaucrat week† every year, requiring all managers to spend time working in a store to reestablish contact with the front line and the consumer. The workpace was such that executives joked that IKEA believed in â€Å"management by running around. † Cost consciousness was another strong part of the management culture. â€Å"Waste of resources,† said Kamprad, â€Å"is a mortal sin at IKEA. Expensive solutions are often signs of mediocrity, and an idea without a price tag is never acceptable. Although cost consciousness extended into all aspects of the operation, travel and entertainment expenses were particularly sensitive. â€Å"We do not set any price on time,† remarked an executive, recalling that he had once phoned Kamprad to get approval to fly first class. He explained that economy class was full and that he had an urgent appointment to keep. â€Å"There is no first class in IKEA,† Kamprad had replied. â€Å"Perhaps you should go by car. † The executive completed the 35 0-mile trip by taxi. The search for creative solutions was also highly prized with IKEA. Kamprad had written, â€Å"Only while sleeping one makes no mistakes.The fear of making mistakes is the root of bureaucracy and the enemy of all evolution. † Though planning for the future was encouraged, overanalysis was not. â€Å"Exaggerated planning can be fatal,† Kamprad advised his executives. â€Å"Let simplicity and common sense characterize your planning. † In 1976, Kamprad felt the need to commit to paper the values that had developed in IKEA during the previous decades. His thesis, Testament of a Furniture Dealer, became an important means for spreading the IKEA philosophy, particularly during its period of rapid international expansion. (Extracts of the Testament are given in Exhibit 3. Specially trained â€Å"IKEA ambassadors† were assigned to key positions in all units to spread the company’s philosophy and values by educating their subordinates a nd by acting as role models. 4 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) 906-414 In 1986, when Kamprad stepped down, Anders Moberg, a company veteran who had once been Kamprad’s personal assistant, took over as president and CEO. But Kamprad remained intimately involved as chairman, and his influence extended well beyond the ongoing daily operations: he was the self-appointed guardian of IKEA’s deeply embedded culture and values.Waking up to Environmental and Social Issues By the mid-1990s, IKEA was the world's largest specialized furniture retailer. Sales for the IKEA Group for the financial year ending August 1994 totaled SEK 35 billion (about $4. 5 billion). In the previous year, more than 116 million people had visited one of the 98 IKEA stores in 17 countries, most of them drawn there by the company’s product catalog, which was printed yearly in 72 million copies in 34 languages. The privately held company did not report profi t levels, but one estimate put its net margin at 8. 4% in 1994, yielding a net profit of SEK 2. billion (about $375 million). 6 After decades of seeking new sources, in the mid-1990s IKEA worked with almost 2,300 suppliers in 70 countries, sourcing a range of around 11,200 products. Its relationship with its suppliers was dominated by commercial issues, and its 24 trading service offices in 19 countries primarily monitored production, tested new product ideas, negotiated prices, and checked quality. (See Exhibit 4 for selected IKEA figures in 1994. ) That relationship began to change during the 1980s, however, when environmental problems emerged with some of its products.And it was even more severely challenged in the mid-1990s when accusations of IKEA suppliers using child labor surfaced. The Environmental Wake-Up: Formaldehyde In the early 1980s, Danish authorities passed regulations to define limits for formaldehyde emissions permissible in building products. The chemical compoun d was used as binding glue in materials such as plywood and particleboard and often seeped out as gas. At concentrations above 0. 1 mg/kg in air, it could cause watery eyes, headaches, a burning sensation in the throat, and difficulty breathing.With IKEA’s profile as a leading local furniture retailer using particleboard in many of its products, it became a prime target for regulators wanting to publicize the new standards. So when tests showed that some IKEA products emitted more formaldehyde than was allowed by legislation, the case was widely publicized and the company was fined. More significantly—and the real lesson for IKEA—was that due to the publicity, its sales dropped 20% in Denmark. In response to this situation, the company quickly established stringent requirements regarding formaldehyde emissions but soon found that suppliers were failing to meet its standards.The problem was that most of its suppliers bought from subsuppliers, who in turn bought t he binding materials from glue manufacturers. Eventually, IKEA decided it would have to work directly with the glue-producing chemical companies and, with the collaboration of companies such as ICI and BASF, soon found ways to reduce the formaldehyde off-gassing in its products. 7 A decade later, however, the formaldehyde problem returned. In 1992, an investigative team from a large German newspaper and TV company found that IKEA’s best-selling bookcase series, Billy, had emissions higher than German legislation allowed.This time, however, the source of the problem was not the glue but the lacquer on the bookshelves. In the wake of headlines describing â€Å"deadly poisoned bookshelves,† IKEA immediately stopped both the production and sales of Billy bookcases worldwide and corrected the problem before resuming distribution. Not counting the cost of lost sales and production or the damage to goodwill, the Billy incident was estimated to have cost IKEA $6 million to $7 million. 8 5 906-414 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A)These events prompted IKEA to address broader environmental concerns more directly. Since wood was the principal material in about half of all IKEA products, forestry became a natural starting point. Following discussions with both Greenpeace and World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF, formerly World Wildlife Fund) and using standards set by the Forest Stewardship Council, IKEA established a forestry policy stating that IKEA would not accept any timber, veneer, plywood, or layer-glued wood from intact natural forests or from forests with a high conservation value.This meant that IKEA had to be willing to take on the task of tracing all wood used in IKEA products back to its source. 9 To monitor compliance, the company appointed forest managers to carry out random checks of wood suppliers and run projects on responsible forestry around the world. In addition to forestry, IKEA identified four other a reas where environmental criteria were to be applied to its business operations: adapting the product range; working with suppliers; transport and distribution; and ensuring environmentally conscious stores.For instance, in 1992, the company began using chlorine-free recycled paper in its catalogs; it redesigned the best-selling OGLA chair— originally manufactured from beech—so it could be made using waste material from yogurt cup production; and it redefined its packaging principles to eliminate any use of PVC. The company also maintained its partnership with WWF, resulting in numerous projects on global conservation, and funded a global forest watch program to map intact natural forests worldwide. In addition, it engaged in an ongoing dialogue with Greenpeace on forestry. 10 The Social Wake-Up: Child LaborIn 1994, as IKEA was still working to resolve the formaldehyde problems, a Swedish television documentary showed children in Pakistan working at weaving looms. Amon g the several Swedish companies mentioned in the film as importers of carpets from Pakistan, IKEA was the only highprofile name on the list. Just two months into her job as business area manager for carpets, Marianne Barner recalled the shockwaves that the TV program sent through the company: The use of child labor was not a high-profile public issue at the time. In fact, the U. N. Convention on the Rights of the Child had only been published in December 1989.So, media attention like this TV program had an important role to play in raising awareness on a topic not well known and understood—including at IKEA. . . . We were caught completely unaware. It was not something we had been paying attention to. For example, I had spent a couple of months in India learning about trading but got no exposure to child labor. Our buyers met suppliers in their city offices and rarely got out to where production took place. . . . Our immediate response to the program was to apologize for our ignorance and acknowledge that we were not in full control of this problem.But we also committed to do something about it. As part of its response, IKEA sent a legal team to Geneva to seek input and advice from the International Labor Organization (ILO) on how to deal with the problem. They learned that Convention 138, adopted by the ILO in 1973 and ratified by 120 countries, committed ratifying countries to working for the abolition of labor by children under 15 or the age of compulsory schooling in that country. India, Pakistan, and Nepal were not signatories to the convention. 1 Following these discussions with the ILO, IKEA added a clause to all supply contracts—a â€Å"black-andwhite† clause, as Barner put it—stating simply that if the supplier employed children under legal working age, the contract would be cancelled. To take the load off field trading managers and to provide some independence to the monitoring process, the company appointed a third-party agent to monitor child labor practices at its suppliers in India and Pakistan. Because this type of external monitoring was very unusual, IKEA had some difficulty locating a reputable and competent company to perform the task. Finally, they appointed a 6IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) 906-414 well-known Scandinavian company with extensive experience in providing external monitoring of companies’ quality assurance programs and gave them the mandate not only to investigate complaints but also to undertake random audits of child labor practices at suppliers’ factories. Early Lessons: A Deeply Embedded Problem With India being the biggest purchasing source for carpets and rugs, Barner contacted Swedish Save the Children, UNICEF, and the ILO to expand her understanding and to get advice about the issue of child labor, especially in South Asia.She soon found that hard data was often elusive. While estimates of child labor in India var ied from the government’s 1991 census figure of 11. 3 million children under 15 working12 to Human Rights Watch’s estimate of between 60 million and 115 million child laborers,13 it was clear that a very large number of Indian children as young as five years old worked in agriculture, mining, quarrying, and manufacturing, as well as acting as household servants, street vendors, or beggars.Of this total, an estimated 200,000 were employed in the carpet industry, working on looms in large factories, for small subcontractors, and in homes where whole families worked on looms to earn extra income. 14 Children could be bonded—essentially placed in servitude—in order to pay off debts incurred by their parents, typically in the range of 1,000 to 10,000 rupees ($30 to $300). But due to the astronomical interest rates and the very low wages offered to children, it could take years to pay off such loans. Indeed, some indentured child laborers eventually passed on t he debt to their own children.The Indian government stated that it was committed to the abolition of bonded labor, which had been illegal since the Children (Pledging of Labour) Act passed under British rule in 1933. The practice continued to be widespread, however, and to reinforce the earlier law, the government passed the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act in 1976. 15 But the government took a less absolute stand on unbonded child labor, which it characterized as â€Å"a socioeconomic phenomenon arising out of poverty and the lack of development. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986 prohibited the use of child labor (applying to those under 14) in certain defined â€Å"hazardous industries† and regulated children’s hours and working conditions in others. But the government felt that the majority of child labor involved â€Å"children working alongside and under the supervision of their parents† in agriculture, cottage industries, and s ervice roles. Indeed, the law specifically permitted children to work in craft industries â€Å"in order not to outlaw the passage of specialized handicraft skills from generation to generation. 16 Critics charged that even with these laws on the books, exploitive child labor—including bonded labor—was widespread because laws were poorly enforced and prosecution rarely severe. 17 Action Required: New Issues, New Options In the fall of 1994, after managing the initial response to the crisis, Barner and her direct manager traveled to India, Nepal, and Pakistan to learn more. Barner recalled the trip: â€Å"We felt the need to educate ourselves, so we met with our suppliers. But we also met with unions, politicians, activists, NGOs, U. N. rganizations, and carpet export organizations. We even went out on unannounced carpet factory raids with local NGOs; we saw child labor, and we were thrown out of some places. † On the trip, Barner also learned of the formation o f the Rugmark Foundation, a recently initiated industry response to the child labor problem in the Indian carpet industry. Triggered by a consumer awareness program started by human rights organizations, consumer activists, and trade unions in Germany in the early 1990s, the Indo-German Export Promotion Council had joined up with key 906-414 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) Indian carpet manufacturers and exporters and some Indian NGOs to develop a label certifying that the hand-knotted carpets to which it was attached were made without the use of child labor. To implement this idea, the Rugmark Foundation was organized to supervise the use of the label. It expected to begin exporting rugs carrying a unique identifying number in early 1995.As a major purchaser of Indian rugs, IKEA was invited to sign up with Rugmark as a way of dealing with the ongoing potential for child labor problems on products sourced from India. On her return to Sweden, Barner again met frequently with the Swedish Save the Children’s expert on child labor. â€Å"The people there had a very forward-looking view on the issue and taught us a lot,† said Barner. â€Å"Above all, they emphasized the need to ensure you always do what is in the best interests of the child. † This was the principle set at the heart of the U. N.Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), a document with which Barner was now quite familiar. (See Exhibit 5 for Article 32 from the U. N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. ) The more Barner learned, the more complex the situation became. As a business area manager with full profit-and-loss responsibility for carpets, she knew she had to protect not only her business but also the IKEA brand and image. Yet she viewed her responsibility as broader than this: She felt the company should do something that would make a difference in the lives of the children she had seen.It was a view that was not universally held within IKEA, where many were concerned that a very proactive stand could put the business at a significant cost disadvantage to its competitors. A New Crisis Then, in the spring of 1995, a year after IKEA began to address this issue, a well-known German documentary maker notified the company that a film he had made was about to be broadcast on German television showing children working at looms at Rangan Exports, one of IKEA’s major suppliers.While refusing to let the company preview the video, the filmmaker produced still shots taken directly from the video. The producer then invited IKEA to send someone to take part in a live discussion during the airing of the program. Said Barner, â€Å"Compared to the Swedish program, which documented the use of child labor in Pakistan as a serious report about an important issue without targeting any single company, it was immediately clear that this German-produced program planned to take a confrontational and aggressive approac h aimed directly at IKEA and one of its suppliers. For Barner, the first question was whether to recommend that IKEA participate in the program or decline the invitation. Beyond the immediate public relations issue, she also had to decide how to deal with Rangan Exports’ apparent violation of the contractual commitment it had made not to use child labor. And finally, this crisis raised the issue of whether the overall approach IKEA had been taking to the issue of child labor was appropriate. Should the company continue to try to deal with the issue through its own relationships with its suppliers?Should it step back and allow Rugmark to monitor the use of child labor on its behalf? Or should it recognize that the problem was too deeply embedded in the culture of these countries for it to have any real impact and simply withdraw? 8 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) 906-414 Exhibit 1 IKEA Stores, Fiscal Year Ending August 1994 a. Historica l Store Growth 1954 Number of Stores 0 1964 2 1974 9 1984 52 1994 114 b. Country’s First StoreFirst Store (with city) Country Sweden Norway Denmark Switzerland Germany Australia Canada Austria Netherlands Singapore Spain Iceland France Saudi Arabia Belgium Kuwait United States United Kingdom Hong Kong Italy Hungary Poland Czech Republic United Arab Emirates Slovakia Taiwan Year 1958 1963 1969 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1978 1980 1981 1981 1983 1984 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1991 1991 1992 1994 City Almhult Oslo Copenhagen Zurich Munich Artamon Vancouver Vienna Rotterdam Singapore Gran Canaria Reykjavik Paris Jeddah Brussels Kuwait City Philadelphia Manchester Hong Kong Milan Budapest Platan Prague Dubai Bratislava TaipeiSource: IKEA website, http://franchisor. ikea. com/txtfacts. html, accessed October 15, 2004. 9 906-414 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) Exhibit 2 IKEA History: Selected Events Year 1943 1945 1948 1951 1955 1 956 1958 1961 1963 1965 1965 1973 1974 1978 1980 1980 1985 1985 1991 Event IKEA is founded. Ingvar Kamprad constructs the company name from his initials (Ingvar Kamprad), his home farm (Elmtaryd), and its parish (Agunnaryd). The first IKEA ad appears in press, advertising mail-order products. Furniture is introduced into the IKEA product range.Products are still only advertised through ads. The first IKEA catalogue is distributed. IKEA starts to design its own furniture. Self-assembly furniture in flat packs is introduced. The first IKEA store opens in Almhult, Sweden. Contract with Polish sources, IKEA’s first non-Scandinavian suppliers. First delivery is 20,000 chairs. The first IKEA store outside Sweden opens in Norway. IKEA opens in Stockholm, introducing the self-serve concept to furniture retailing. IKEA stores add a section called â€Å"The Cook Shop,† offering quality utensils at low prices.The first IKEA store outside Scandinavia opens in Spreitenbach, Switzer land. A plastic chair is developed at a supplier that usually makes buckets. The BILLY bookcase is introduced to the range, becoming an instant top seller. One of IKEA’s best-sellers, the KLIPPAN sofa with removable, washable covers, is introduced. Introduction of LACK coffee table, made from a strong, light material by an interior door factory. The first IKEA Group store opens in the U. S. MOMENT sofa with frame built by a supermarket trolley factory is introduced. Wins a design prize. IKEA establishes its own industrial group, Swedwood.Source: Adapted from IKEA Facts and Figures, 2003 and 2004 editions, and IKEA internal documents. 10 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) 906-414 Exhibit 3 â€Å"A Furniture Dealer’s Testament†Ã¢â‚¬â€A Summarized Overview In 1976, Ingvar Kamprad listed nine aspects of IKEA that he believed formed the basis of the IKEA culture together with the vision statement â€Å"To create a better everyd ay life for the many people. † These aspects are given to all new employees through a pamphlet titled â€Å"A Furniture Dealer’s Testament. † The following table summarizes the major points: Cornerstone 1.The Product Range—Our Identity 2. The IKEA Spirit—A Strong and Living Reality 3. Profit Gives Us Resources Summarize Description IKEA sells well-designed, functional home furnishing products at prices so low that as many people as possible can afford them. IKEA is about enthusiasm, renewal, thrift, responsibility, humbleness toward the task and simplicity. IKEA will achieve profit (which Kamprad describes as a â€Å"wonderful word†) through the lowest prices, good quality, economical development of products, improved purchasing processes and cost savings. â€Å"Waste is a deadly sin. † 4.Reaching Good Results with Small Means 5. Simplicity is a Virtue Complex regulations and exaggerated planning paralyze. IKEA people stay simple in st yle and habits as well as in their organizational approach. IKEA is run from a small village in the woods. IKEA asks shirt factories to make seat cushions and window factories to make table frames. IKEA discounts its umbrellas when it rains. IKEA does things differently. â€Å"We can never do everything everywhere, all at the same time. † At IKEA, you choose the most important thing to do and finish that before starting a new project. The fear of making mistakes is the root of bureaucracy. † Everyone has the right to make mistakes; in fact, everyone has an obligation to make mistakes. 6. Doing it a Different Way 7. Concentration—Important to Our Success 8. Taking Responsibility—A Privilege 9. Most Things Still Remain to be IKEA is only at the beginning of what it might become. 200 stores is Done. A Glorious Future! nothing. â€Å"We are still a small company at heart. † Source: Adapted by casewriters from IKEA’s â€Å"A Furniture Dealer†™s Testament†; Bertil Torekull, â€Å"Leading by Design: The IKEA Story† (New York: Harper Business, 1998, p. 12); and interviews. 11 906-414 IKEA’s Global Sourcing Challenge: Indian Rugs and Child Labor (A) Exhibit 4 a. Sales IKEA in Figures, 1993–1994 (fiscal year ending August 31, 1994) Country/region Germany Sweden Austria, France, Italy, Switzerland Belgium, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway North America (U. S. and Canada) Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia Australia SEK billion 10. 4 3. 9 7. 7 7. 3 4. 9 0. 5 0. 4 35. 0 Percentage 29. 70% 11. 20% 21. 90% 20. 80% 13. 90% 1. 50% 1. 00% b. PurchasingCountry/region Nordic Countries East and Central Europe Rest of Europe Rest of the World Percentage 33. 4% 14. 3% 29. 6% 22. 7% Source: IKEA Facts and Figures, 1994. Exhibit 5 The U. N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 32 1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development. . States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social, and educational measures to ensure the implementation of the present article. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of other international instruments, States Parties shall in particular: (a) (b) (c) Provide for a minimum age for admission to employment Provide for appropriate regulation of hours and conditions of employment Provide for appropriate or other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of the present article.

Schindlers List

â€Å"Attitude is a little thing that makes a big difference† Winston Churchill. This relates to the film Schindlers List as the main character Oskar Schindler has a major change in attitude towards the Jewish people. At the beginning of the film Schindler is introduced as a selfish man looking to exploit the Jews as workers. While he witnesses the liquidation of the Ghettos Schindler’s personality soon changes as he releases he can make a difference. This is shown using specific shots and lighting techniques.Through the use of hand-held cameras and camera shots used during the invasion of the Krakow Ghettos the chaos and fear makes an impact on the viewer. Hand-held cameras were used in amongst the crowds of Jews and Nazi soldiers to give the viewer an experience of what these people went through during this terrible time. The hand-held was used when we see an old lady walking in an alley when we see Nazi troops approaching. High angle shots are used to make the Jews l ook small and powerless during this scene. Whereas low angle shots are used to make the Nazi officials look powerful.The camera techniques help to make an impact on the viewer during this scene. Schindlers change was shown through the effects of colour and lighting techniques. Lighting was used to reveal Schindlers change. Lighting was used when we see that his face is shown fully lit whereas in the beginning of the film his face is only half lit to show that he was a selfish man. Colour was used to show how important a particular part of the scene was. This was shown when we see a little girl in red walking around the crowds of Jews being killed, while there is a children’s choir singing in the background.This scene had made Schindler finally realise what the Nazis were doing to the Jews was wrong. This shows that Schindler went through a change in attitude as he realises what the Jews have had to go through. The use of sound and music were used during the invasion when the Jews are in hiding. Sound was used amongst the people as it had been silent and one sudden move there is a. The sound was used to make the The uses of visual techniques during the liquidation were to show the change that Schindler had gone through after witnessing the events of the iquidation. The importance of this scene was to show the difference of Schindler from how he was in the beginning of the film to what he had been changed into at the end. The liquidation also gave us a sight on the importance of how Schindler had used specific techniques to show his face being fully lit. As Edward Evenetthale once said â€Å"I am only one, but I am one. I cannot do everything, but I can do something and I will not let what I cannot do interfere with what I can do. †

Embedding Economic Drivers in Participative Water Management Essays

Embedding Economic Drivers in Participative Water Management Essays Embedding Economic Drivers in Participative Water Management Paper Embedding Economic Drivers in Participative Water Management Paper Abstract Country location influences the institutional surroundings of the infrastructures related to water systems. In the Netherlands, water management has its own particularities. Temporarily inflow of affluent water from the rivers or the sea resulted in a highly developed institutional setting based on flood risk prevention. From an economic perspective, managing water is about allocating and using water in an effective and efficient way. This article deals with the coordination problem related to multi functionality of water systems. ‘Allocation efficiency’ is the issue. The diversity of water systems such as rivers, lakes, ditches or groundwater is multifunctional and within the systems, demand is competing. Decision makers should be aware of the different aspects of infrastructures that interfere with water systems. Further on in the decision-making, these aspects need to be valued. This may be done explicitly (for example in a formal cost-benefit analysis) or implicitly. Implicit valuation takes place when the outcome of a choice is expressed without an explicit weight and value of the effects a project has. The focus of this article is on economic drivers that express values to decision makers and thereby may stimulate the implementation of planned water projects. The problem addressed here is how these economic drivers may be institutionalized and what  institutional (re-)designs are necessary to organize the coordination problem related to the multi functionality of water systems. It is part of participative water management that, under the name of Joint Planning Approach (JPA), is developed during the ‘Freude am Fluss’ international project that aims at formulating and realizing adaptation strategies in water management, specifically the realization of more space for rivers. 1. Introduction The Netherlands are known for their water management practices. Obviously, this is resulting from an economy located in the delta of the rivers Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt. Country location influences its institutional surroundings, which means that also water management in a different setting has other particularities. High water levels of rivers or the sea resulted in a robust institutional setting concerning flood risk prevention. From an economic perspective, managing water is about allocating and using water in an effective and efficient way. In this respect three main levels of decision making can be identified: the international level (with countries and supranational organizations); the national level (with governments and stakeholders); the level of the individual (with users like consumers and producers). This article deals with the efficient allocation of the many functions water systems provide. In other words, the coordination problem related to multi functionality of water systems is at stake. For example, a river, or one of the many other types of water system, may absorb waste streams (cooling water, polluted waste water) in competition with ecological and other economic activities, such as production of drinking water. From an economic point of view, clean, fresh water can be interpreted as a scarce commodity. Scarcity of water and water systems is sometimes reflected in the prices users need to pay, or in collective resources (collected taxes), governments provide money out of. Increasingly, water managers allocate natural resources of a water system on the basis of the value of water systems. This means that decision-makers should be fully aware of all these values connected to a water system. These values may be explicitly reflected in a market price or implicitly acknowledged by means of meeting qualitative or quantitative standards. For decision-makers, this issue of getting a complete and accurate understanding of the value of water systems is crucial, but generally, information asymmetry is at hand. The policy makers are often not fully aware of the costs and benefits of each separate function a water system possibly may fulfill. Besides, stakeholders want to take their role in the decision- making process that precedes the acknowledgement or rejection of the functions a water system may fulfill in the future or against which costs this will take place. These values can be explicated by the involvement of the public or representing stakeholders within decision-making processes (Van Ast and Boot, 2003). Nevertheless, decision-makers can never be sure that the outcome of public participation in terms of value is realistic for the full range of values of the water system. How can policy makers be assisted in this complex and dynamic challenge of getting ecological values incorporated in a balanced way? Not only economic and ecological functions are at stake, but also social and cultural values have to be considered. What are the rules of this allocation game? 2. Contents The importance of economic drivers that can stimulate implementation of planned water projects is high (WMO, 2006). Creating more room for rivers is necessary to reduce climate change induced water levels. Realization of projects that aim at giving back territories to natural systems however is extremely difficult in terms of costs and culture. The ‘Freude am Fluss’ (FaF) international project aims at improving and smoothening the realization of ‘Room for Rivers’ projects. A basis stream of research within the project deals with participative water management that is developed under the name of ‘Joint Planning Approach’. One of the research objectives of FaF (2008) is the identification of economic drivers that can foster realization of these projects, including the institutional arrangements that can embed these drivers. Figure 1 shows the different steps in the FaFproject, that were taken to develop a JPA that includes public and private value s. Explication of these values can function as necessary economic drivers for the realization of water projects. The JPA should assure that economic, ecological and social values that policy makers aim for, are integrated into regional planning. This integration is approached from the perspective of the process of institutional design that policy makers are key actors in. Figure 1, economic drivers and the Joint Planning Approach After the introduction of the subject and the contents of this article, section 3 describes the framework of interactive policy-making JPA. Further the economic drivers of managing multifunctional water systems and the infrastructures that contribute to or even co-create the multi-functionality are elaborated. In many cases the water system is accompanied by infrastructures that play a key role to provide the services to the people. This is the case for infrastructures related to functions such as providing drinking water, sanitation and transportation. The difficulty of reflecting the total economic value of water systems in decision making is discussed in section 4. To illustrate the concepts, firstly, in section 5 a framework is presented, in which economic drivers can be captured. This is illustrated in a case study, presented in section 6. Finally, in section 7 conclusions are drawn and practical recommendations are presented. 3. Joint Planning Approach The Joint Planning Approach (JPA) is developed within the Freude am Fluss-project (FaF, 2008). It incorporates the idea that the performance of water systems has an ecological, a social and an economical dimension. It assists the capturing of the total economic value of innovative regional planning by measuring the economic value realized by managing the multi-functional dimensions of water systems. If innovative regional planning implies a sound combination of, for example the housing function of riverbeds (like the use of floating houses) and the transportation function (transportation by boats and transportation by trucks over roads), a net economic benefit should be gained. In general, the Joint Planning Approach (JPA) provides an action oriented framework on how authorities, local communities and private actors can organize the planning process from the earliest stage of problem identification up to the agreement on what measures to implement (De Groot, 2008). Additionally, the JPA facilitates the design of institutional arrangements that embeds the values (framed as economic drivers) related to concrete measures that shape regional in combination with its river systems. In the FaF-project, this framework is applied to regional planning along rivers. The term ‘joint’ implies that all morally considerable actors that are involved in causes, effects or solutions of the problem are also involved, directly or by representation, in the planning process. These actors are referred as stakeholders and are regarded as the ‘morally considerable entities’. This includes individual people but also future generations, and the elements of nature that are recognized, e.g. in policy documents, as carrying intrinsic value. The representation can be directly, e.g. as a farmers group representing involved floodplain farmers or indirectly, as an NGO representing the interests of nature. However, representation may imply that also governmental organizations take part of the planning  process because they are democratically vested to represent all kinds of values the protection of which individual people cannot easily organize (the ‘common good’ or ‘system-level rationality’) or tend to forget in the midst of the affairs of daily life. JPA should help in realizing inclusive planning that involves a broad set of stakeholders that depends on the perception of the problem, its causes, effects and solutions. No standard lists of participants in FaF can be provided. Because perceptions what the problems and possible solutions are to manage a river and its direct surrounding may shift over time. The possible technological solutions with its challenges and threats may evolve. Also, the political context may change and consequently the policy approaches towards managing water systems. The Joint Planning Approach is based on a number of principles emerging from various scientific disciplines (De Groot and Lenders, 2006). Crucial is the contribution from ecological science with insights and new concepts of non-equilibrium ecosystem behavior (Smits et al., 2000). This has triggered notions of ‘adaptive management’, that do not aim to fix ecosystems in states of presumed climax, but aim to maintain ecosystem quali ty, for the benefit of people and nature alike, by way of intensive monitoring and flexible responses to change (e.g. Holling and Gunderson, 2002). Adaptive management should be guided by a long-term vision in order to prevent that the sum of many small adaptive steps could end up in an undesired overall result. In this respect policy approaches such as ‘room-for rivers’ is incorporated into the plans that result from the FaF-project. JPA may be coined as a practical guideline but the relationships it builds upon are derived from theoretical insights into the combinations of variables that affect the incentives and actions of stakeholders in water systems (Ostrom, 2007). The JPA builds upon strong relationships between the Resource systems (the geographical area with its water and landscape), resource units, governance system and users of the resource systems. It are these relationships that frame economic drivers into variables (institutional arrangements) that build the governance of rivers. De Groot and Lenders (2006) brought forward in the FaF-project that in the social sciences, resistance against the seemingly irrevocable logic of the Tragedy of the Commons (the idea that communality of property can only lead to destruction of that property; see for instance Hardin (1968)) has led to increased insight that local communities can be quite successful in the management of their common resources, and the conditions under which this is possible (e.g. Ostrom 1990). At the same time, however, local communities cannot easily be entrusted with monitoring and management of systems far beyond their spatial scale, such as sea-wide fisheries or whole river basins. The combination of new drive for community-based work and the limitation of community capacities has led to the rise of ‘co-management’ (or ‘collaborative management’, or ‘joint management’) as a central concept for empirical study, management ideas and theory-making. In co-management, local actors and supra-local agencies share visions and divide roles in the management of a given resource, in styles and balances depending on the resource itself, its local and supra-local functions, and the local and supra-local management capacities. See for instance Borrini-Feyerabend et al. (2004) for a general exploration and Wilson et al. (2003) reviewing the co-management traditions existing already in the fishery sector. Concurrently in policy and political science, approaches have emerged that rather than viewing policies as mechanistic models of inputs and outputs and viewing politics as a mere competition between opposing programs. In a broad system perspective, with the world as a complex system, learning, feedback and adaptations take place through highly linked, self-organizing networks. This makes it easier to understand how collaborative dialogues function and produce innovative actions. See for instance Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) for an overview. A sufficient level of social capital (organizational density and mutual trust within communities and between communities and government) is an important prerequisite for such dialogues to be successful, but at the same time, research has shown that social capital can also be produced during the dialogues themselves (e.g. Ostrom 1990). The latter may be of special relevance for societies in transition, where social capital tends to be low; see for ins tance Chloupkova et al. (2003), comparing social capital in Denmark and Poland. In these terms, the JPA can be characterized as an approach for the adaptive, vision-guided collaborative planning of river sections, in a framework of room-for-river policies. The JPA is composed of a number of public planning steps. They vary much in weight and content in each actual planning situation, but the steps give the JPA its basic structure. The process starts with a ‘step zero’, in which the initiators internally design the envisaged JPA application of their local situation. Then follows the real (public) planning process, ordered in six steps. The whole of the process is formulated as: 0. Preparing the JPA application 1. Mutual learning 2. Shared visioning 3. Rules and institutions 4. Joint options exploration 5. Joint design and decision-making 6. Towards implementation. Especially from the step from visioning towards a realistic project is depending from the existence of economic drivers. This means that the identification of economic drivers that can fire up the JPA-process is of utmost importance. Typically for the approach is that the JPA generates technical plans but also helps in creating the institutional context in which these technical options can be implemented. For example, sometimes the permitting processes should allow for a regional plan along with some interventions in a river like the location of a windmill park or new infrastructures that facilitate transportation of goods and electricity. Political will may force current permitting procedures to change. Conflicting values needs to be settled in a JPA and the outcome embedded by means of a institutional (re-)design. JPA has been practiced in areas in France, Germany and The Netherlands. The standardized interactive methodology shows remarkably positive results in terms of understanding under stakeholders (FaF, 2008). Policy makers in different countries may have different opinions about the relevance of some economic drivers, the values behind these drivers and how these values become drivers behind concrete projects in regional planning. Some policy makers may want to perform a Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) by means of using a single decision-making supportive technique and present a net benefit to  societal welfare. Other policy makers want to aim for some specific economic benefits for a sector (for example, transportation or housing) and represent this stake in the decision-making process. JPA acknowledges this diversity up to some degree by stimulating participation of (often local) stakeholders. Also, JPA makes explicit that the rules of the game that guide the stakeholders in their policy making are not static but may change as result of the planning procedures. It acknowledges the dynamics in relevant values and the governance of a water system (Kuks, 2002; Hoevenaars, 2004; Oosthoek, 2006). JPA may increase these dynamics itself and shapes the institutional context of managing river systems. 4. Economic drivers As has been mentioned, one of the objectives of FaF is the identification of economic drivers for ‘room for the river’ solutions. To explore economic drivers in relation to integrated water management a variety of approaches are of interest, each of which contains different elements. A distinction can be made in different types of benefits for society, different functions of the river system and several values of natural systems. The focus on a more holistic approach to water management as a water system results in the balancing of economic, environmental and social benefits for a wide set of stakeholders. a) Economic Benefits Economic benefits reflect the creation of welfare in a society and can be divided into goods and services of freshwater ecosystems. Economic goods include water (for drinking, agriculture, cooling, production etc.), bio-products (fish, shellfish, plants) and resources (clay, sand). Economic services include flood control and water quality control of river plains, wetlands and watersheds (including forest landscapes) and tourism. The classification of an impact on welfare is strongly related to the economic valuation process. b) Ecological Benefits Ecological benefits focus specifically on increased biodiversity and protection of rare species in river basins. These environmental benefits include river basins as living space for species like fish and birds, diversity of river landscapes (forests, wetlands, floodplains) and dynamic ecosystems (nutrient rich, versatile). The classification of ecological effects as benefits is strongly related to the definition and interpretation of ecological quality. c) Social (and cultural) Benefits Social benefits include elements of enjoyment related to nature (recreation and tourism, living space) and sustainability aspects (future generations), but also social justice and equity. The positively perceived changes in the allocation of economic benefits and costs to specific stakeholders are strongly related to the adoption of certain policy principles, such as the Polluter Pays Principle. It this respect, it is important that in most cases the realisation of regional plans have benefits for the society that are neither pure economic, social or ecological. The impacts cannot be captured within one dimension for all stakeholders. The key of integrated water management is to approach the water system as a whole, from upstream to downstream, and balancing upstream-downstream stakeholder interests and needs. Table 1 illustrates the different combinations of the potential variety in impact on the benefits. Table 1: Example of water system performance: three dimensions of the potential impact of regional plans. In the Netherlands several institutions are involved in realising new approaches in water management. The key drivers are governments, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) and academic institutions, often in close collaboration with each other and with the private sector. A good example is the Freude am Fluss (FaF) project, of which a key component, JPA, has been mentioned extensively. Involving many institutions in these kind of projects results in spreading of the new introduced approaches. JPA aims at identifying the economic drivers for a management approach to rivers and the design of institutions that transform economic drivers into the identification of current and future cash flows related to these drivers. By using this approach economic drivers may become financial drivers for individual stakeholders. A practical example of the identification of economic drivers is the ‘One Europe More Nature Program’ of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF). WWF is collaborating with local knowledge institutes, governments and the private sector in river basins in 6 EU member states to identify, create and communicate practical examples of alternatives for rural development in Europe, that are good for people and for nature. At the foundation of the project is the Living Rivers concept aiming at conserving nature from source to sea. For example in the Netherlands, WWF is working with Stichting Arc in the Rhine river basin in the Gelderse Poort, where a new economy is being built that is not only also creating new jobs, but also helps to restore ecological processes and landscape quality. From the perspective of the physical system, in this case the river system, different functions can be identified. Economic drivers are based on the value people attribute to the different functions. From the perspective of society, economic drivers refer to the perceived benefit of a value that actors attribute to the consequences for them of a decision affecting the river system. These benefits can be assessed from two perspectives: those benefits that accrue to society as a whole (macro-economic drivers) and benefits that accrue to individual stakeholders (micro-economic drivers). Table 2 summarizes the main drivers in relation to the functions of a river system. Table 2: Examples of macro-economic and financial drivers of new water management approaches. If the benefits that people attribute to the above mentioned functions are associated with real cash flows, the economic drivers are simultaneously financial drivers. However, many economic benefits and costs are not associated with direct cash flows. For example, the value of a house may increase as a result of regional planning, but as long as the house has not been sold, the gain is not associated with ‘real’ cash flows. On the other hand there is an increase in property tax, which shows clearly the increased value. Another example is the increase of recreation activities around an upgraded river system. This is generally not associated with any actual cash expenditure, since the river is freely accessible to all. However, indirect economic activities that could be the result should  also be taken into account. Revenues from transport to the area or increased mental wellness resulting in higher productivity can surely lead to an implicit increase of economic value and hence should be taken into consideration as an economic driver. It is often regarded as a pitfall that many cash flows are not clearly visible. In the determination of the economic feasibility, innovative ways of integrated water management may be regarded as economically unfeasible due to a lack of insight into the true economic value of regional plans that create more room for the river in an integrated way. With respect to the value of water systems and water in specific, some reflection should be added about the special position, water has in economic sciences. Obviously, treating water as an economic good can have large advantages in optimizing water scarcity issues. For other goods and services that water systems can deliver, the efficiency improvement can be expected. Nevertheless, water delivers very special services and water is certainly not a ‘normal’ economic good. Table 3 compares the different attributes of water to other important commodities. Table 3: Comparison water and other commodities, based on Van der Zaag and Savenije (2006; pp. 14) Amongst others, Van der Zaag and Savenije (2006) state that just letting the market decide upon the price, does not result in the most favourable allocation of the scarce good ‘water’. They argue that water should have a set price. This fixed price sends out a message to all users that water is a scarce good and should be treated that way. Their view on the economics of water is pragmatic, implying informed choices of use. Applying this approach to all other values water systems can deliver, means that prices  should not depend on the market. Putting fixed prices can help people in understanding the need for a change in their approach to water management. Often, water is still seen as an enemy that can do a lot of harm, neglecting that water is essential for human survival and a special commodity that should be treated that way. Besides, other types of values can play an important role too. Social, cultural, religious and historical values that can not be translated easily in financial terms can be distinguished, next to issues related to risk. Also the intrinsic value, that by definition does not have any relation with (economic) use, should also be considered. Regarding the socio-cultural value of water systems, The Netherlands as a country provide an outstanding illustration. The Dutch have been fighting against water for centuries. Water history has been dominated by a battle against the water of both rivers and sea. Many practices of water management reflect the incorporation of these kinds of socio-cultural values, like the habit to discharge water into the ocean as fast as possible. The proposed measures in the ‘Room for the River’ program entail a fundamental change in attitude towards water management in the Netherlands. Instead of fighting against the water, the paradigm is changed in living with water. This includes that the water is given more space and should be retained longer in certain areas, meaning a loss of land in this highly populated country. The history of fighting against water has much influence on how people feel about the proposed measures in the ‘Room for the River’ project. A fundamental change in attitude is not likely to happen overnight. Socio-cultural value can also be illustrated by the essential role water plays in major religions around the world as a sacred gift of God. Religious interpretations and rules about ethically adequate use of water can strongly influence water management practices, but for that matter does not seem to have much influence in ‘Room for the Riverprojects’’ in Western Europe. In contrast, risk issues do have much influence on people’s attitude towards water systems and hence the value they attribute to the functions the water system delivers. Research by Klaveren and Oostdijk (2002) found that especially the place of building the house, i.e. on a safe position, is important for the feeling of safety. Highly visible dikes can also increase this feeling of safety. On the other hand,  misleading or unclear information decreases the feeling of safety experiences by inhabitants. In the empirical research of Broekhoven et al. (2006) peoples values with respect to how The Netherlands should protect itself in the scope of the policy concept of Space for Water were investigated. When Dutch people are asked how they think the Netherlands should protect itself against rising water levels, they respond that a combination of measures should be executed. The majority supports the heightening, enlarging and maintaining of dikes. Only a rather small minority of informed inhabitants supports the creation of retention areas, emergency runoff and reservoirs as risk decreasing. Only very few people name giving more room to the river or using nature as a protection option. It is clear that this ‘dike-culture’, in which dike protected land is valued high, is a large obstacle for ‘room for the river’-projects. On the other hand, many interviewed people consider conservation of historical landscape very important (Klaveren and Oostdijk 2002), even when dike heightening is necessary from a risk perspective. Here the intrinsic value of historical elements in the landscape, of nature and of beauty comes to the surface. In a strict sense, intrinsic value can be defined as the value that is in the object itself, not depending on human valuation. In a more practical meaning it refers to the value for people not depending on practical use (Bouma and Saeijs, 2000). Protecting a historical dike is a good example of an instiutionalised cultural value within water management. The rules of the allocation, or economic processes, are referred to in the institutionaleconomic theory as institutions. Since the re-emergence of institutional economics in the seventies of the last century, the role of contracts within transactions has been the main unit of analysis. Amongst others, Williamson (1999) describes the importance of organizations within a market economy. Besides relative prices also organisational elements, as formalized in contracts, are taken into account. By introducing organizational and context dependent elements in economic theory, recent research is broadening the institutional perspective on economic development. Contracts can be seen  as the institutionalization of norms, values and beliefs that provide rules-of-the game for the economic processes in a society. In practice the design is very difficult because of its complexity. Many actors may be involved, all having their own values, norms and perceived risks related to the final outcomes of the contract. In the case study this will be further explored in section 6. But first, in section 5 a framework for the design of the institutional arrangements dealing with economic drivers is presented. 5. The institutionalization of economic drivers In order to explicate the economic drivers behind Room for the River-projects, a guideline developed in the FaF-project (Van Ast et al, 2008), can be applied by decisionmakers. Taking these steps, divided in three main steps, stimulates the implementation of ‘Room for the River’ in practical cases. Step 1: Create a policy setting that links regional planning with river management (both water quantity and water quality control). Formulate a formal statement in which the multi-functionality of rivers is acknowledged. The link between regional planning and river management should be organized. The following questions may be raised to the relevant stakeholders of the policy process: What are the physical, social and ecological effects of regional planning? To what extent represent these effects a change in the total economic value of the river and for who are these economic drivers relevant? How can the decision-makers account for the total economic value? Step 2: Identify and/or (co-)design cost effective projects that enhance the concept of room for the river (a multi-functional approach to rivers). The set of projects can for example consist of the construction of houses and dikes. The set of projects should have as a result that the river keeps performing its essential functions, together with its economic, social and ecological gains and losses. Step 3: Design of an institutional arrangement that creates drivers for stakeholders based on the generation of economic gains. Four types of institutional processes are of main importance: The establishment of an organisation that enables decision making processes (participation of stakeholders and regulated use of formal costs-benefit approaches, Public Private Partnerships); The development of clear policy and regulation, with rules in a project plan to create space for the river; The release of resources like cash flows, labour and machines; The use of a suitable mix of juridical, economical and social policy instruments. If financial instruments like subsidies and levies are possible, they can go together with the accounting practices at macro and micro level, which enables interaction with stakeholders. As a result stakeholders can be informed about the impact of the regional plans on their costs and benefits. This does not necessarily have to be in the form of a formal cost benefit analyses. Through answering the questions in step 1, (policy setting) the gains and losses are identified and quantified in economic terms in the decision making process. Decisionmakers should decide on how these economic costs and benefits are to be integrated into the decision making process. It is suggested that the following approaches/tools are to be applied: The use of Societal Cost Benefit Analyses (SCBA) with explicit valuation of social and ecological gains and losses: the economic value is calculated by using a valuation technique the participants of a decision making process accepts. Clearly there are differences among a decision-making process which values may be expressed in monetary terms and which not. The use of Societal Cost Benefit Analyses by presenting only those gains and losses represented by market prices. Those gains and losses that are not integrated into the SCBA should be identified and integrated into the rules of the allocation game. Hereby some weights can explicitly be given  to certain aspects of the value of water systems. For example, strict safety norms and quality standards of drinking water. Participation of stakeholders in the decision making process that integrates their economic gains and losses as stakes into the assessment of plans. . The stakeholders may present their own accounting formats for performing their cost-benefit analyses (so-called private cost-benefit analyses). Step 2 (design of measurements) shows that river management and regional planning can enhance the integration of economic drivers by creating policy instruments that integrate the economic drivers into decision making processes based on regulatory push factors (such as levies paid by stakeholders who enjoy some functions of the river) and or creation of financial stimuli (creation of markets for attributes of the regional planning approach such as floating houses, increased market value of housing, revenues of concessions for fishery or drinking water concessions). Step 3 considers the institutional embedding of the drivers. The following case study explores which economic drivers exist for new water management approaches related to spatial development. How these economic values are distributed among the different participants of the decision making process and integrated into the decision making process. This three-step guideline contributes to analysing if economic drivers are strong enough to push forward the concept ‘Room to River’ into the implementation of practical water management projects. Afterwards the development of institutional arrangements is mentioned that may increase the role of these economic drivers. 6. Case The Island of Brienenoord Within the concept ‘Room for the River’ many different types of specific projects and measures are developed. In this case study a project is presented that combines different functions of an area within the riverbed. After describing the background situation of the  area and making a stakeholder analysis, we apply the earlier presented three step-model, developed for capturing the total value of a planned project to stimulate implementation. History and physical, social and ecological effects of regional planning Originally the island was a sandy dune that came to the surface of the river and was artificially heightened in the 19th century to become an island. The 21 hectare island was bought by the baron of Brienen in 1847, who started a salmon fishery on it because the main fish market, Kralingseveer, was just on the other side of the river. The year 1880 was the peak of the Rhine salmon fishery with around 100.000 salmon traded in Kralingseveer alone.The highest point of the island was built to keep the horses that were used for transporting the fishing nets. During the economical crisis of the 1930’s, the island was hired by two institutions that helped the unhealthy people of the packed labour district in the south of Rotterdam. In the second world war, the Germans accepted small private gardens for food production and those stayed ever since. On the east point, the south pillar of the Van Brienenoord bridge has been built. This is also the place where natural processes resulted i n a (small) marshy area with willows, reed and sandy beaches. Since 1989 most of the island is public space and earmarked as an area for further urban development. Project plan and measures In 1993 the World Wide Fund for nature published a new view on the wetlands in the Rotterdam (WNF, 1993). The island of Brienenoord is considered highly potential for nature development along the river and within the city. In 2000 the municipality signed an agreement (covenant) with WWF to develop an integrated plan for a combination of building and nature. At the east side, under and around the bridge pillar, a fresh water tidal system could be developed and be combined with recreation facilities. The area already has a function for nature education and educative hiking trips; since 2000 ‘wild’ cattle is freely grazing the terrain. At the west side, near to the small connecting bridge, a hotel is planned. Based on this covenant architect company Waardenburg draw a plan that was presented on 14 February 2002 in the community council. One day earlier, on February 13th, WWF retreated from the covenant because, as it states, the plan leaves not enough space for  nature and its further development. According to the plan a 180 rooms hotel complex with conference facilities and around 55 expensive apartments should be built on the west side of the island Although the project (the master plan) was not realized in total, a number of separate measures were realized. In practice, discussions may arise which measures were generated in the scope of the master plan and which measures were initiated as a result of other initiatives. Still, as long as they support the mission and realization of the master plan they may be considered. In this respect typical examples are to be listed in the area of infrastructures (roads, bridges, etc.) and nature development. Some specific measures of the master plan are: Construction of a hotel and its facilities; Reconstruction of bridge; Quay (transportation of visitors and temporary stay of boats for the commercial transportation in front of the isle); Nature friendly development of the river bank with reed and willows (planting of willows, reed, †¦). Three step-model In order to create the institutional arrangements that can contribute to capturing the total value of the project, the earlier presented three step-model has been applied. After formalizing the rules within the project (step 1), the gains and losses are identified and quantified in economic terms in the decision making process. Decision-makers should decide on how the economic costs and benefits are to be integrated into the decision making process. It is suggested that the total economic gains should be identified which may be accounted for in the decision-making process that proceeds to the implementation of the project or only some parts of the project. In practice the original plan may not be implemented but only parts of the project (eg. specific measures) may be realized. This is in fact the case with the Island of Brienenoord. It is assumed that project alternatives are assessed and that only cost-effective alternatives will be implemented (step 2). The next  step, design of institutional arrangements (step 3) has never been executed here. The case study should have been followed up with an analysis of the institutional arrangements that embed the economic drivers in the decision-making process. Total economic value, economic and financial drivers In order to obtain understanding of the economic drivers behind the project, a formal cost benefit statement according to the procedure designed by the Dutch research agency STOWA (see www.mkbainderegio.nl) has been arranged. Herewith the separate costs and benefit items could be identified in a cost-benefit framework with accounting rules and the integration of institutions in a public-private partnership. This explicit way of presenting the outcome of a societal cost benefit analyses indicates that the proposed project (Brienenoord plan) results in a welfare increase of 21 million Euros. Despite this net gain at a macro level, the project was not implemented. Only some minor parts of the master plan are realised (building of a small bridge and a quay for recreational boating). Major parts of the plan were rejected because of the institutional arrangements related to the financing of the projects (potential hotel owner should cover the financial risks) and the processes of permits related to: spatial planning; exploitation of hotel and other recreational and nature development of the area; temporary storage of dangerous gasses (in boats) along the island. The arguments for individual stakeholders to retreat from the plan were: WWF: expected extra nature value is too low. Inhabitants of nearby houses (directed located at river): the 70 meter high hotel will take away the river view. Real estate developer: Potential financial risks in a period of economic recession. Before the project is to be implemented, a number of conflicts among stakeholders need to be solved. This would imply far-reaching and probably unrealistic institutional redesigns. The case study shows that institutional design is needed at the level of individual stakeholders (the rules that define a project as financial acceptable or not). These rules are embedded in a context that imposes these financial thresholds. Also, the decision to express ecological values in monetary terms or not, can be perceived differently among stakeholders. These perceptions may even change in time for one stakeholder. Besides, conflicting interests among the stakeholders may hinder the implementation of the plan, reflecting a distributional issue of the costs and benefits. Institutional re-design can only overcome this hindrance with enough political power to overrule one or more stakeholders, with or without financial compensation for those who face the costs of the plan. 7. Conclusions and Recommendations Economic drivers can be found in macro- (welfare) and micro- (cash flow) level and can be divided into implicit and explicit values. Economic drivers that manifest themselves as cash flows theoretically are also reflected at a macro level. However, by far not all macro economic drivers are presented as cash-flows at a micro level. This integration of macro economic drivers needs to be integrated into the decision-making process by policy makers who want to stimulate projects with a significant macro economic added value and that are expected to be realized or at least accepted by non-governmental actors (such as individual project planners, households or companies). This integration can take place by means of participation. Each participant can push forward its own perceived added value or loss of value the project implies to him or her. The presented case study shows that if parties can express their costs and benefits, this does not guarantee that a project with a net macro economic added value will succeed. The distribution and differences of the perceived uncertainties about the costs and benefits may hinder the implementation of a project. Again, this added value does not necessary mean a cash flow related to this benefit. Additional rules of the game may integrate these values and express their perceived significance to decision-makers. Most extremely, certain values can be  safeguarded by compliance to strict legal rules. However, the case study shows that conflicting values and distribution of values and costs may not always be overcome by institutional (re-)design. Increase the transparency in standardized costs and benefits (arrangements that for example create a website at the level of water board; (see STOWA, www.mkbainderegio.nl); Mobilize a project developer for realization of housing and recreational values (facilitate and speed-up the process of permitting); Scan relevancy of recreational value increase and mobilize potential benefits (hotels, restaurants, etc.) through arrangements that communicate to the often unknown (potential) stakeholders of rivers; Mobilize stakeholders with positive side effects with respect to health and ecological values: involve national government and down stream stakeholders in public-private partnerships (agriculture house owners, local communities and water boards, recreation sector). To identify these stakeholders a societal CBA can be performed with an orientation at the total river basin. 8. References Borrini-Feyerabend, G., M. Pimbert, M. T. Farvar, A. Kothari, and Y. Renard (2004). Sharing Power. 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